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This paper presents a model of an urban area with local income taxes used to ﬁnance
a local public good. Households diﬀer in both incomes and their taste for housing.
The existence of a segregated equilibrium is shown in a calibrated two-community
model assuming single-peaked distributions for both income and housing taste. The
equilibrium features income segregation of the population across the communities.
The segregation is, however, imperfect: some rich households can also be found
in poor communities and vice-versa. The calibrated model is able to explain the
substantial diﬀerences in local income tax levels and average incomes across com-
munities as observed in e.g. Switzerland. The numerical investigation reveals that
the ordering of community characteristics critically depends on the substitutability
between the public and the private good. The numerical investigation also suggests
that taste heterogeneity reduces the distributional eﬀects of local tax diﬀerences.
The numerical investigation furthermore suggests that the rich community is able
to set lower taxes when it is small.
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11 Introduction
Decentralized ﬁnancing of local public goods is a natural counterpart of decentralized
decision about their provision. As Oates (1972) already argued, local units deciding upon
public programs are more likely to trade oﬀ costs against beneﬁts if these programs are
ﬁnanced by local taxes. Fiscal Federalism is intensively debated in the European Union.
On the one hand there are attempts to coordinate ﬁscal policies across EU member states.
On the other hand, increased regional self-government, as implied by the subsidiarity
principle, calls for some regional ﬁscal autonomy.
I develop a model of an urban area with local income taxes used to ﬁnance a local
public good. Households diﬀer in both incomes and their taste for housing. The existence
of an asymmetric equilibrium is shown in a calibrated two-community model assuming
single-peaked distributions for both income and housing taste. The equilibrium features
income segregation of the population across the communities. This segregation is, how-
ever, imperfect: some rich households can also be found in on average poor communities
and vice-versa. The calibrated model is able to explain the substantial diﬀerences in local
income tax levels and average incomes across communities as observed in e.g. Switzer-
land. In accordance with the empirical ﬁndings, the rich community shows higher taxes
and both lower housing prices and lower public goods provision than the poor commu-
nity. This order of community characteristics depends, however, on the preferences for
the local public good. The above ordering of community characteristics holds for low
degrees of substitutability between public and private goods. When the public good is
easily substituted by private goods, the rich community exhibits higher housing prices
and public goods provision as well as higher taxes. The numerical investigation also sug-
gests that taste heterogeneity reduces the distributional eﬀects of local tax diﬀerences.
The numerical investigation furthermore suggests that the ability of the rich community
to set low taxes is higher when it is physically small. However, a tax haven need not be
small.
Following Tiebout’s (1956) seminal work, there is a long tradition of modelling ﬁs-
cal decentralization at community level. The consideration of heterogeneous household
incomes by Ellickson (1971) and Westhoﬀ (1977) moved the focus away from seeking
optimal community size to the study of urban areas with given community borders.
While this strand of research was followed by a large number of studies investigating
local property taxation (surveyed in Ross and Yinger 1999, and Epple and Nechyba,
2004), there have been few contributions on local income taxation. Hansen and Kessler
(2001a) elegantly study a local transfer ﬁnanced by local income taxes in a model with
inelastic housing demand and an exogeneous Laﬀer curve. Calabrese (2001) studies lo-
cal income taxation in model a similar to Hansen and Kessler but with price responsive
housing demand. Konishi (1996) provides an existence proof for equilibria in models
2with income taxation under weak assumptions. He does not study the extent of income
sorting in the established equilibria.
Multi-community models with agents that diﬀer in income typically predict perfect
segregation of the population by income, i.e. households of the same income group live
in the same community. However, recent literature on spatial income sorting (Epple
and Sieg, 1999, Hardman and Ioannides, 2004, Ioannides, 2004, Ioannides and Zabel,
2003 and Bayer, McMillan and Rueben, 2003) forcefully demonstrate that the sorting
is very imperfect. Furthermore, Rhode and Strumpf (2003) show a long term trend of
decreasing income sorting despite falling costs of moving. Schmidheiny (2004) shows sig-
niﬁcant but imperfect sorting among movers in a metropolitan area. This clear empirical
ﬁnding is almost completely missing in the theoretical literature. A notable exception
are Epple and Platt (1998) who study a model with property taxation and show that
the introduction of (continuous) heterogeneous tastes for housing indeed predicts a more
realistic incomplete segregation of the population. Kessler and L¨ ulfesmann (2004) in-
troduce two types of households with high or low taste for the public good in a model
with local income taxation to establish equilibria with imperfect income sorting. Keely
(2004) attributes imperfect income sorting to the role of housing developers. Hindriks
(2001) creates income mixing by assuming that households have an intrinsic preference
for either of two locations.
This paper follows Epple and Platt (1998) but introduces heterogeneous tastes in a
multi-community model with local income taxation and a partly substitutable public
good. A similar model has been investigated by Goodspeed (1989). This study general-
izes Goodspeed’s analysis both by introducing heterogeneous tastes and by using a real-
istic single-peaked distribution of the population. Not only does this single-peakedness
capture a realistic feature of urban economies, but it also challenges the existence of
equilibria in multi-community models with income taxation. The possible non-existence
of segregated equilibria under a non-uniform income distribution is shown by Hansen
and Kessler (2001b). My model can also be seen as a generalization of Kessler and
L¨ ulfesmann (2004) and consequently shares many of their ﬁndings. The main diﬀerence
is the introduction of a housing market which allows me to establish equilibria without
the assumption of an exogeneous Laﬀer curve of tax income (caused by e.g. losses from
distortive taxation). Equilibrium housing prices provides a further mechanism for in-
come sorting which is studied in this paper. Rather than assuming heterogenous taste
for the public good I introduce heterogeneous taste for housing, for which an empirical
counterpart can easily be found. Furthermore I introduce a continuum of housing tastes
rather than just two types; this allows me to study the role of variance in preferences.
The numerical simulations are based on a Swiss metropolitan area. Switzerland is
an exemplary case of a federal ﬁscal system and oﬀers a laboratory for the study of tax
decentralization. Switzerland is a federation of 26 states, the so-called cantons. The
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Figure 1: Community characteristics in the metropolitan area of Zurich.2
cantons are divided into individual communities of varying size and population. The
roughly 3000 communities form individual jurisdictions with great autonomy in terms
of providing local public goods such as school services or infrastructure. The unique
situation in Switzerland is that the communities ﬁnance their expenditures mainly by
local income taxes. While cantons autonomously organize the whole tax system, e.g.
the degree of tax progression or the split between income and corporate taxes, the
communities can generally only set a tax shifter in a given cantonal tax scheme. There
is considerable variation in income taxes across Swiss communities. For example, for a
two-child family with a gross income of 100,000 Swiss francs (CHF) the sum of cantonal
and community income tax ranged from CHF 3,500 (city of Zug) to CHF 14,500 (city of
Neuchˆ atel) in the year 2001.1 Within metropolitan areas the (community) tax diﬀerences
1These are tax rates for the cantonal capitals. Some smaller communities show even higher/smaller
4are smaller but may still diﬀer by a factor of 1.5 in the Zurich area for example. Figure 1
shows the substantial diﬀerences in local tax levels and income and housing prices across
this community system.2 The bottom-left map visualizes the considerable segregation
by incomes in the Zurich area. The top-right and the bottom-left maps demonstrate
a striking relationship between income taxation and spatial income distribution: the
local share of rich households is almost an inverted picture of the local tax levels. It is
particularly interesting to see whether multi-community models are able to explain the
observed tax diﬀerentials. Note that municipality ﬁnancing by local income taxation
is working for more than 150 years in Switzerland. This system of more than 3000
municipalities thus empirically contradicts Nechyba’s (1997) claim that “local income
taxes play no empirically important role” and that their inexistence in the United States
proofs “property taxes a dominant tax strategy for local governments”.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 introduces the formal model and derives
the properties of the household utility function which induce segregation of the popula-
tion. In the ﬁrst part of Section 3 the calibration used for the numerical investigation
of the equilibrium is described. In the middle part of Section 3 the numerical equilib-
rium is presented and the welfare implications of the decentralized decision making are
discussed. The remainder of Section 3 discusses the robustness of the result to changes
in the calibrated parameters. Section 4 draws conclusions.
2 The Model
The model economy is divided into J distinct communities. The area is populated
by a continuum of heterogeneous households, which diﬀer in both income y ∈ [y,y],
0 < y,y < ∞, and a parameter α ∈ [0,1] describing their taste for housing. Incomes and
tastes are jointly distributed according to the density function f(y,α) > 0. There are
three goods in the economy: a composite private consumption b, housing h and a local
publicly provided good g.3 The latter is local in the sense that it is only consumed by
the residents of a community.
A household can move costlessly and chooses the community in which its utility is
maximized as place of residence. Each community indexed by j can individually set
the amount of the local public good gj and the local income tax rate tj ∈ [0,1]. These
decisions are made in a majority rule vote by the residents respecting budget balance in
the community. Each community has a ﬁxed amount of land Lj from which housing stock
lower tax rates.
2Data from the following sources: Commuter: Swiss Federal Statistical Oﬃce, Census 1990. Tax
rates: Statistisches Amt des Kantons Z¨ urich, Steuerf¨ usse 1997. Income distribution: Swiss Federal Tax
Administration. Housing prices: W¨ uest und Partner, Zurich. Considered are all communities where
more than 1/3 of the working population is commuting to the center community.
3See Section 2.4 for a discussion of the nature of the public good.
5is produced. All households are renters and the housing stock is owned by an absentee
landlord. The price for housing pj in community j is determined in a competitive
housing market. The private good is considered as numeraire. A community j is fully
characterised by the triple (tj,pj,gj). The set of all possible community characteristics
is given by Γ = [0,1]×I R++×I R+. Location choice, voting and the resulting community
characteristics are simultaneously determined in the general equilibrium.
2.1 Households
The preferences of the households are described by a Stone-Geary utility function (Stone,
1954)
U(h,b,g;α) := αln(h − βh) + (1 − α)ln(b − βb) + γ ln(g − βg),
where h is the consumption of housing, b the consumption of the private good and g
the consumption of the publicly provided good. βh > 0, βb > 0 and βg are sometimes
referred to as existential needs for housing, private good and public good, respectively.
The parameter α ∈ [0,1] describes the households’ taste for housing, as will become
apparent below.
Households face a budget constraint:
ph + b ≤ y(1 − t),
where p is the price of housing and t the local income tax. Note that the price of the
private good is set to unity. Maximisation of the utility function with respect to h and
b subject to the budget constraint yields the housing demand function
h∗ := h(t,p,g;y,α) =
α[y(1 − t) − pβh − βb]
p
+ βh
and the demand for the the private good b∗ = y(1 − t) − ph∗. Both demand functions
are linear functions of after-tax income y(1 − t), reﬂecting the fact that Stone-Geary
utility implies a linear expenditure system (LES) and vice-versa (see e.g. Deaton and
Muellbauer 1980). Housing demand is increasing in α as long as the household can
satisfy its existential needs, i.e. ∂(h)/∂(α) > 0 iﬀ y(1−t) > pβh +βb > 0. α = 0 implies
that the housing demand is equal to the existential needs and hence does not change
with household income. α = 1 denotes a household which spends all extra income on
housing after paying his existential need.
The indirect utility
V (t,p,g;y,α) := U(h∗,b∗,g;α)
gives the utility of a household with income y and preference parameter α in a community
with income tax t, housing prices p and a public good provision g.
62.2 Location Choice
Households take the community characteristics as given when they choose their place
of residence. They value the diﬀerent communities by their local tax rates tj, housing
prices pj and public good provision gj. A household chooses to locate in the community
in which its utility is maximal. A household chooses j if and only if
V (tj,pj,gj;y,α) ≥ V (ti,pi,gi;y,α) for all i. (1)
An important feature of this model is that households have to value the communities
with respect to 3 dimensions (p, g, and t) of community characteristics. In previously
studied multi-community models, communities are fully described by 2 dimensions only.
In models with local property taxes (e.g. Epple and Platt, 1998), the households only
care about after-tax housing prices p(1−t) and not about p and t independently. Income
tax models (e.g. Kessler and L¨ ulfesmann, 2004) usually abstract from a housing market
and fully characterize the communities by local taxes t and public goods or transfers g.4
The 3-dimensional characteristics space allows for a much richer structure of potential
equilibria. E.g. it is conceivable that a community with both higher taxes and higher
housing prices than any other community can attract residents by oﬀering more public
goods.5
I will now show how the assumed household preferences lead to spatial segregation
of the population. Before describing the allocation of households across communities
in propositions 1 and 2, I explicitly state the speciﬁc properties of the assumed utility
function that generate spatial segregation. Property 1 is trivial; Properties 2 and 3 are
a direct consequence of the speciﬁed utility function assuming that existential needs are
strictly satisﬁed, i.e. y(1 − t) > pβh + βb > 0 and g > βg. The derivation is provided in
the Appendix.
Property 1 (Relative preferences)
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< 0.
4The reduction to a 2-dimensional characteristics space simpliﬁes the analysis fundamentally. An
exception is Goodspeed (1986, 1989) who studies the 3-dimensional characteristics space. However,
Goodspeed seems not to detect the implied technical diﬃculties (see footnote 8).
5Examples of such equilibria are shown in section 3.6.
7Property 1 signs the marginal rate of substitution M.,. between each pair of community
characteristics. Property 1 states that a household can be compensated for a tax increase
either by more public good provision or by lower housing prices. Westhoﬀ (1977) calls
this trade-oﬀ the relative preference for the public good. Property 1 also states that
a household is compensated for higher housing prices by more public good provision.
Property 1 holds under the standard assumption about the inﬂuence of prices, taxes and
public goods on the household’s well-being and is not speciﬁc to Stone-Geary utility.
Property 2 (Monotonicity of relative preferences)














Property 2 shows that the relative preference for community characteristics changes
monotonically with both income and taste. Property 2a reveals that rich households need
more public good compensation than poor households for the same increase in taxes or
prices.6 Property 2b states that households with a strong taste for housing need a smaller
increase in public good provision or a larger decrease in tax rates to be compensated
for a price increase than households with weak taste for housing. Property 2 explains
why diﬀerent households choose diﬀerent locations in equilibrium. It is equivalent to the
Spence-Mirrless condition in information economics. Property 2 is a consequence of non-
homothetic nature of Stone-Geary preferences. ∂Mg,p/∂y < 0 is shared with Ellikson
(1971), Westhoﬀ (1977), Epple, Filimon and Romer (1984, 1993) and Goodspeed (1986,
1989). Property ∂Mg,t/∂y < 0 is shared with Goodspeed (1986, 1989).7 Property 2b
introduces preference heterogeneity in the same spirit as Epple and Platt (1998).
6Note that ∂Mt,p/∂y cannot be signed as the marginal rate of substitution between tax and housing
price, Mt,p, decreases with income if ε > 1 and increases if ε < 1.
7Goodspeed(1989) shows that ∂Mg,p/∂y < 0 is equivalent to εg,y/εg,p > εh,y, where εg,pg is the
(shadow) price elasticity of demand for the public good and εh,y is the income elasticity of demand for
housing. Goodspeed(1989) also shows that ∂Mg,t/∂y < 0 is equivalent to εg,y/εg,p > 1, where εg,y is
the income elasticity of public goods demand. He points to empirical evidence that shows that both
assumptions are reasonable.
8Property 3 (Proportional shift of relative preferences)












are independent of y, where Mt,g = 1/Mg,t.




The ﬁrst part of Property 3a states that the ratio of the income eﬀects on the g − t
trade-oﬀ and on the g − p trade-oﬀ is independent of the income level. It is insightful
to describe this property in terms of discrete changes. Consider an increase in local
taxes by dt. The tax increase is compensated by dtg(y) of public goods. An increase of
local housing prices by dp is compensated by another amount dpg(y) of public goods.
Both compensations decrease with a (discrete) increase in income income y (property
2a): dydtg := dtg(y + dy) − dtg(y) < 0, dydpg := dpg(y + dy) − dpg(y) < 0. The ﬁrst
part of Property 3a states now that the ratio dydtg/dydpg of the income eﬀects on the
two compensations is constant w.r.t. to income. The second part of Property 3a is
explained analogously. Property 3b states that the g − t trade oﬀ is independent of
housing preferences α. Property 3b is a stronger version of Property 3a. Property 3
is a feature of the assumed Stone-Geary utility but considerably less intuitive than the
ﬁrst two properties. It results from both the linear expenditure system and the additive
separability between g and (h,b). Although very speciﬁc, Property 3 is important as
it rules out intractable segregation patterns where the middle income class prefers one
community while rich and poor households prefer another community (see proof in
Schmidheiny 2002).8
The distribution of the households across communities implied by Properties 2 and
3 is described in the following paragraphs. A ﬁrst observation is that all households are
indiﬀerent between all communities when the communities have identical community
characteristics, i.e. (ti,pi) = (tj,pj) for all j,i. In this case the households settle so as
all communities have the same income distribution.
The following lemma and propositions describe how the utility maximizing house-
holds will be allocated across communities.
8It seems diﬃcult to justify either Property 3a or Property 3b empirically. Goodspeed seems to
derive perfect income segregation without Property 3 in the same setting. However, the graphical proof
he provides in Goodspeed (1986) is incomplete. Goodspeed (1989) uses the Stone-Geary utility function
for numerical simulations and fails to detect the missing assumption.
9Lemma 1 (Boundary indiﬀerence)
Consider the subpopulation with taste α. If a household with income y′ prefers to live in
community j and another household with income y′′ > y′ prefers to live in community
i, then there is a ’border’ household with income ˆ yji(α), y′ ≤ ˆ yji(α) ≤ y′′, which is
indiﬀerent between the two communities.
Proof: The household with income y′ prefers j to i, hence Vj(y′) − Vi(y′) ≥ 0, where
Vj(y) := V (tj,pj,gj;y,α). The opposite is true for a household with income y′′ thus
Vj(y′′) − Vi(y′′) ≤ 0. Vj(y) − Vi(y) is continuous in y as V is continuous in y. The
intermediate value theorem implies that there is at least one ˆ yji between y′ and y′′ s.t.
Vj(ˆ yji) − Vi(ˆ yji) = 0. The existence of ˆ yji follows from f(y,α) > 0. 2
The set of ’border’ households is described by the function ˆ yji(α). Equivalently, the
set of border households is given by the inverse function ˆ αji(y), implicitly deﬁned by
Vj(ˆ αji(y)) = Vi(y, ˆ αji(y)).
Deﬁnition 1 (Conditional income segregation)
An allocation of households is called conditionally segregated by incomes if the J sets
Ij = {y : household with income y and taste α prefers community j} satisfy
• Ij is an interval for all j,
• Ij ∩ Ii = Ø for all i  = j,
• I1 ∪ ... ∪ IJ = [y,y]
for any α and for any j: Ij  = Ø for at least one α.
Deﬁnition 1 means that in a subpopulation with equal tastes any community is populated
by a single and distinct income class.
Proposition 1 (Conditional income segregation)
When the household preferences are described by a Stone-Geary utility function and all
J communities exhibit distinct characteristics, (tj,pj,gj)  = (ti,pi,gi) for all i  = j, then
the allocation of households is conditionally segregated by incomes.
Proof: The proof uses the fact that the utility diﬀerence Vj − Vi = V (tj,pj,gj;y,α) −













Consider three households with income y′ < y′′ < y′′′ respectively and suppose that the
allocation of households does not satisfy Deﬁnition 1: y′ as well as y′′′ prefer community
j, but y′′ strictly prefers community i. Given the location preference of y′ and y′′′ it
follows from Lemma 1 that there is an indiﬀerent household ˆ y, y′ ≤ ˆ y < y′′. The above
10sign condition implies that all households richer than ˆ y, i.e. y′′′ , also prefer i, which is
a contradiction. 2
Schmidheiny (2002) shows that the Properties 1, 2a to 3a are suﬃcient conditions
for income segregation.
Deﬁnition 2 (Conditional taste segregation)
An allocation of households is called conditionally segregated by tastes if the J sets Ij =
{α : household with income y and taste α prefers community j} satisfy
• Ij is an interval for all j,
• Ij ∩ Ij = Ø, for all i  = j,
• I1 ∪ ... ∪ IJ = [0,1]
for any y and for any j: Ij  = Ø for at least one y.
Deﬁnition 2 means that in a subpopulation with equal incomes, any community is pop-
ulated by a single and distinct interval of tastes.
Proposition 2 (Conditional taste segregation)
When the household preferences are described by a Stone-Geary utility function and
all J communities exhibit distinct characteristics, (tj,pj,gj)  = (ti,pi,gi) for all i  = j,
then the allocation of households is conditionally segregated by tastes. Households in
communities with lower housing prices have stronger tastes for housing than households
in communities with higher prices.
Proof: The proof of the ﬁrst sentence is analogous to Proposition 1 using the sign
condition (derived in the appendix) sign(∂(dVj − dVi)/∂α) = sign(pi − pj). Second
sentence: Consider pi < pj and a household (ˆ y, ˆ α) which is indiﬀerent between the two
communities j and i, hence Vj(ˆ y, ˆ α) = Vi(ˆ y, ˆ α). Then any household with the same
income y and taste parameter α > ˆ α prefers community i, i.e. Vj(ˆ y, ˆ α) < Vi(ˆ y, ˆ α), since
∂(dVj − dVi)/∂α < 0 if pi < pj. 2
Schmidheiny (2002) shows that the Properties 1, 2b to 3b are suﬃcient conditions
for segregation by tastes.














j(α) and yj(α) are the lowest and highest income in community j given the
subpopulation with taste α. y
j(α) is given by the locus of indiﬀerent households ˆ yji
between community j and its ‘adjacent’ community i with lower income households. The
other boundaries yj(α), αj(y) and yj(α) are given analogously. Closed form expressions
for these boundaries are given in the Appendix. Note that the adjacent community might
not be the same for all subpopulations. This is demonstrated in Figure 2 showing four
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Figure 2: Examples of segregation patterns in the three-community case. The areas
denoted by ‘1’, ‘2’ and ‘3’ show the attributes of the households that prefer community
1, 2 or 3 respectively.
2.3 Housing Market
Within each community housing is produced from land and non-land factors. The hous-
ing supply in each community j is assumed to be an increasing function of the housing
price pj and the land dedicated to housing Lj. The housing supply function
HSj = Lj   p θ
j
is adopted from Epple and Romer (1991), whose is derived from an explicit housing
production function; θ is the ratio of non-land to land input.








In equilibrium, the price for housing in community j clears the housing market
HDj = HSj. (2)
12Deﬁnition 3 (Equilibrium Income Elasticity of Housing Price)
The elasticity of equilibrium housing prices w.r.t. to aggregate disposable income a com-













Deﬁnition 3 deﬁnes the reaction of equilibrium housing prices to changes in disposable
income of the population and hence in the tax rate. Note that the reaction of the housing
price depends not only on the housing supply function but also on the characteristics,
i.e. tastes and incomes, of the local population.
2.4 Public Sector
Community j sets the amount of a local public good. It is public in the sense that it
is publicly provided and that all residents consume the same amount of the good. The
cost of providing this good is an increasing function of the amount provided gj and the
number of inhabitants nj in the community. For simplicity, I assume:
C(gj,nj) = c0 + c1 gj nj ,
where c0 ≥ 0 and c1 > 0. Note that there are no spillovers in the production of the
good across communities. The increasing cost in the number of beneﬁciaries means that
the good is not a pure public good since there is rivalry in consumption. One can think
of e.g. schools, street construction and maintenance, city planning activities, etc. A
positive constant c0 implies increasing returns to scale in the production of the public
good.
The community ﬁnances the publicly provided good by a proportional income tax.







tj y f(y,α)dy dα = nj tj Eyj ,
where Eyj is the mean income in community j. In equilibrium, the community’s budget
is balanced:
C(gj,nj) = Tj . (3)
The tax rate and the amount of public goods are determined in a majority rule vote







Figure 3: Voters’ indiﬀerence curves in the (t,g) space.
community as given. Epple and Romer (1991) call voters with this behavior myopic, as
they ignore the migration consequences from the political in their community.9
Deﬁnition 4 (Public choice frontier)
The public choice frontier PCFj in community j is the set of (pj,gj,tj) triples, where
the pair (gj,tj) satisﬁes budget balance (Eq. 3) and pj clears the housing market (Eq.
2) given the housing demand with tax rate tj.
Proposition 3 (Segregation of voters)
Consider the subpopulation of households with taste α in community j and assume that
the income elasticity of the housing price (Def. 3) is below 1 for all (pj,tj) on the PCFj.
If a household ˜ yj(α) prefers the triple (pj,gj,tj) on the PCFj to all other triples on the
PCFj, then any richer (poorer) household opposes a reduction (increase) in taxes.
Proof: The proof refers to Figure 3. Consider the indiﬀerence curves of three voters
with household income y′ < ˜ y < y′′ respectively, given the same taste parameter α. These
indiﬀerence curves take into account the reaction of the housing prices to a change in
the income tax rates. The straight line is the PCF in community j. One can verify
in the ﬁgure that the pivotal voter ˜ y prefers the pair (gj,tj) to all other combinations
on the PCF. It is shown in the Appendix that the indiﬀerence curve is monotonically
increasing in t and that its derivative w.r.t. t is decreasing in y if the income elasticity
9Voter myopia is assumed in Westhoﬀ (1977), Rose-Ackerman (1979), Epple and Romer (1991) and
Fernandez and Rogerson (1996). Fernandez and Rogerson (1996) rationalize ‘myopicness’ by modelling
the households’ decisions as a two-stage process in which households ﬁrst choose their place of residence
and then choose their consumption bundle and political behavior in the chosen community. Assuming
perfect foresight, the political outcome in the second stage is anticipated when choosing the location.
In Epple and Platt (1998) voter take the migrational eﬀects of their voting decision into account while
holding other locations’ political decision constant. Kessler and L¨ ulfesmann (2004) allow the households
to relocate after voting. I failed to ﬁnd numerical equilibria without assuming myopic voters.
14of the housing price (Def. 3) is below 1. Therefore, all richer voters, e.g. y′′, dislike all
(g,t) ∈ PCFj combinations with taxes lower than tj, while all poorer voters, e.g. y′,
dislike higher taxes. 2
˜ yj(α) is called the locus of pivotal voters. It is a decreasing function in α, as the price
reduction induced by higher taxes is more appreciated by households with a stronger
taste for housing. Note that from the perspective of a na¨ ıve voter who ignores the
housing market, Proposition 3 holds without the additional assumption of the housing
market tightness.
Deﬁnition 5 (Majority rule voting equilibrium)
A triple (pj,gj,tj) on community j’s PCF is called a majority rule voting equilibrium
when no other triple on the PCF is strictly preferred by a majority of the community’s
residents.
As an implication of Proposition 3, a majority rule voting equilibrium in community















and the housing market is not too tight.
2.5 Equilibrium
The overall equilibrium of the multi-community model is a situation in which the location
choice and political equilibrium are consistent, i.e. no household has an incentive to
move, local taxes and public good provision is the outcome of a majority rule vote by
the local residents and the local housing markets are in equilibrium.
Deﬁnition 6 (Equilibrium)
A set of community characteristics (pj,gj,tj), j = 1,...,J, and an allocation of individual
households across communities is an equilibrium if and only if
• all households choose their community to maximise their utility,
• the housing market clears in all communities,
• there is a majority rule voting equilibrium in all communities.
Note that there is always a symmetric equilibrium in which all communities show iden-
tical characteristics and the local income and taste distribution of households is a repli-
cation of the universe when c0 = 0 and housing supply is homogeneous of degree one in
15land area. However, symmetric equilibria may not be stable.10 The focus of this paper
is on the empirically interesting case of asymmetric equilibria where all communities
exhibit distinct characteristics.
Existence of asymmetric equilibrium is proved by Goodspeed (1986) in a model
with income taxes, taste homogeneity, na¨ ıve voters and a uniform income distribution.
Epple, Filimon and Romer (1993) show existence in a model with property taxes and
homogeneous tastes. Unfortunately, as in other models with taste heterogeneity (Epple
and Platt, 1998), a proof of existence and uniqueness of this equilibrium can not be
established. However, equations (1) to (4) provide the basis for a computational strategy
to ﬁnd equilibria numerically.
3 Numerical Equilibrium
In this section the qualitative and quantitative properties of the model are investigated
in a fully speciﬁed and calibrated model.
3.1 Calibration
I calibrate the above outlined model to the metropolitan area of Zurich in Switzerland.
The area around the city of Zurich forms the biggest Swiss metropolitan area. The
city of Zurich has about 330 thousand inhabitants and is the capital of the canton
(state) of Zurich. The canton of Zurich counts 1.2 Million inhabitants in 171 individual
communities. As described in the introduction, each of these communities can set its
own levels of income taxes.
The analysis is restricted to the city of Zurich and a ring of the most integrated
communities around the center. This ring is formed by all communities in the canton
of Zurich with more than 1/3 of the working population commuting to the center.11
Figure 4 shows a map with the city of Zurich and the thus deﬁned ring of 40 communities.
The community characteristics of this area are also discussed in the introduction (see
Figure 1). The calibrated parameters are summarized at the bottom of Table 1.
Land Area The whole area has a physical size of 349km2, of which 88km2 (25%)
form the city of Zurich. 140km2 are dedicated to development, 53km2 (38%) in the
10The notion of ‘stability’ in an intrinsically static model is rather peculiar. Nevertheless, equilibria
in static multi-community models are often judged by their ‘dynamic’ behavior. In this ad-hoc inter-
pretation, an equilibrium is called ‘stable’ when the change of community characteristics induced by the
migration of ‘few’ households gives these households an incentive to move back.
11The number of commuters to the city of Zurich and the size of the working population in the
communities is based on the 1990 Census. This somewhat arbitrary deﬁnition of the urban area is
chosen to justify the model’s assumption that households income is exogenous, i.e. that they choose
their place of residence independent of where they work. It results in a set of communities closest to
the central business district. A wider area around the city of Zurich would include smaller but locally
important job clusters such as the city of Wintherthur and the towns around the airport.
16Figure 4: The Zurich metropolitan area around the lake of Zurich.
inner city and 87km2 in the fringe communities. In 1998, the whole area was populated
by around 628’000 inhabitants, of whom 334,000 lived in the city and 294,000 in the
fringe communities.12 This agglomeration is modelled as two distinct jurisdictions with
land area L1 = 0.4 and L2 = 0.6 respectively.
Income Distribution. The income distribution is calibrated with data from the Swiss
labor force survey.13 The 1995 cross-section contains detailed information on 1124 house-
holds in the above deﬁned region. These households had average income (after state and
federal taxes) of CHF 92,000, median income of CHF 66,700 and a quartile distance
of 47,700.14 I use a log-normal distribution to approximate this right-skewed distri-
bution. A log-normal distribution with mean E(lny) = 11.1 and standard deviation
SD(lny) = 0.55 matches the observed median and quartile distance. For numerical
tractability, the model distribution is truncated at a minimum income of ymin = 23,000
and a maximum income ymax = 500,000.15
Taste Distribution. The Swiss labor force survey also contains the monthly housing
expenditure of renters which allows to calibrate the distribution of tastes.16 Using the
housing demand function in section 2.1, the taste parameter α of a household with dis-
posable income yd can be calculated as (ph−phmin)/(yd−yd,min), where ph is expenditure
on housing and phmin is the housing expenditure of the household with minimal dispos-
12Source: Statistisches Amt des Kantons Z¨ urich, Gemeindedaten per 31.12.1998.
13Swiss Federal Statistical Oﬃce, Schweizerische Arbeitskr¨ afterhebung (SAKE) 1995.
14State and Federal taxes were deducted from net household income (after social security contribution)
assuming a two-child family.
15The minimum income is subsistence level for a one-person-household as deﬁned by the Schweizerische
Konferenz f¨ ur Sozialhilfe (SKOS) and adjusted for inﬂation. The maximum income is chosen arbitrarily,
but has no inﬂuence on the numerical simulation due to the low weight on high incomes.
16Of course, there is a selection bias by only considering renters. Because the proportion of renters is
very high in Switzerland (65% in the data set used), this is justiﬁed.
17able income yd,min. The disposable income of a household yd is calculated as reported
household income minus federal, state and communal taxes. The average yearly housing
expenditure of households around subsistence level is taken to approximate phmin. This
enables to approximate each household’s taste parameter α. A beta distribution with
mean E(α) = 0.17 and standard deviation SD(α) = 0.11 describes the distribution of the
so calculated taste parameter well. Taste and income are assumed to be uncorrelated.17
Housing and Public Good Production The price elasticity of housing supply is θ = 3
as in Epple and Romer (1991) and Goodspeed (1989). The production of the public
good exhibits constant per capita costs, i.e. c0 = 0 and c1 = 1.
Preference Parameters The parameters βh = 700, βb = 13000 are chosen such that
the consumption bundle of the minimal income household in equilibrium corresponds
to the empirical ﬁndings. The beneﬁt from additional units of the public good is taken
from Goodspeed (1989) as γ = 0.02. The existential needs for the public good βg = 4000
is set to produce equilibrium tax rates close to the observed ones.
Additional data can be used to assess the accuracy of the calibrated model. In
the year 1997, the communal tax level in the fringe communities was on average 19%
(minimum -35%, maximum +1%) lower than in the inner city.18 For a single household
with taxable income of CHF 100,000 this a tax rate of 8.4% in the center and on average
6.8% in the periphery. The rental price for housing was CHF 238/m2 in the center and
ranging from CHF 181 to CHF 268 in the periphery.19 Although the housing price in
the periphery were on average 6% lower than in the center, the distinctively low-tax
communities south-east of the city center exhibit substantially higher housing prices
than the center. Figure 1 in the introduction visualizes the spatial distribution of tax
rates, incomes and housing prices in the area. The median income in the city of Zurich
is CHF 58,700 opposed to CHF 75,200 in the fringe communities.
3.2 Simulated Equilibrium
The equilibrium values pj, gj and tj, i = 1,2, must satisfy equations (2), (3) and (4)
and guarantee that the households reside in the community they prefer as expressed in
equation (1). Unfortunately, there is no closed form solution to this nonlinear system
of 6 equations, i.e. Equations 3, 2 and 4 in both communities, and 6 unknowns. The
17Allowing for correlation between taste and income would introduce an (additional) systematic rela-
tionship between income and housing demand. This systematic relationship is, however, already modelled
by the non-homothetic preferences that lead to decreasing relative housing expenditures with increasing
incomes. The random component of preferences is therefore assumed to be orthogonal to income. This
assumption is also used in Epple and Platt (1998) without explicit mention.
18Source: Statistisches Amt des Kantons Z¨ urich, Steuerf¨ usse 1997.
19Source: W¨ uest und Partner, Zurich. Oﬀer prices for apartments in newspapers and in the internet
in 1997.
18Table 1: Equilibrium values of the simulation.
model simulation data
heterogen. tastes homogen. tastes har-
center periphery center periphery monized whole center periphery
Community characteristics
t: income tax rate 0.085 0.059 0.110 0.056 0.064 0.084 0.068
b)
p: housing price 10.48 11.92 9.19 12.37 11.40 238 224
a)
g: public good prov. 4488 5225 4335 5390 5032
Size
L: land area 0.40 0.60 0.40 0.60 1 0.38 0.62
n: inhabitants 0.284 0.716 0.314 0.686 1 0.532 0.468
Income distribution
Ey: average income 52,995 88,687 39,368 96,460 78,547 92,082 86,186 98,690
Median income 41,424 76,986 39,989 83,798 67,356 66,705 58,714 75,209
Welfare consequences (compensating variation w.r.t. tax harmonization)
Average cv 50.9 84.4 41.8 455.9
n (cv> 0) 0.171 0.506 0.180 0.686
The model parameters are: βh = 700, βb = 13000, βg = 4000, γ = 0.02, E(α) = 0.17, SD(α) = 0.11
(heterogeneous tastes), SD(α) = 0 (homogeneous tastes), E(lny) = 11.1, SD(lny) = 0.55, ymin =
23
′000, ymax = 500
′000, θ = 3, c0 = 0 and c1 = 1.
a) Housing rent per m
2 in CHF. Ranging from CHF
181 to CHF 268 in the periphery.
b) Local income tax rate for single household with taxable income of
CHF 100,000. Ranging from 5.5% to 8.5% in the periphery.
equation system is therefore numerically solved for the equilibrium values of the model.20
Table 1 shows the equilibrium values for the calibrated model in columns 1 and 2.
The equilibrium values for the case of taste homogeneity are given for comparison in
columns 3 and 4. As can be seen, the equilibrium values of the two communities diﬀer
substantially. I will refer to the high-tax community 1 as the ‘center’ and the low-tax
community 2 as the ‘periphery’.21 The tax rate t1 in the center is 44% higher than in
the suburbs, whereas the housing price is 12% and the public provision 14% lower. The
average household income in the center is CHF 53 thousand a year compared to CHF 89
thousand in the suburbs. Thus, the simulated model is able to explain tax and income
diﬀerences of the magnitude observed in the Zurich area. Although it is very diﬃcult
to empirically measure the provision of public goods, anectodical evidence suggests that
20Numerically solving the equation system is tedious and time-consuming. The aggregation of indi-
vidual demand and voting behavior requires double integrals over the community population. These
integrals cannot be calculated analytically. Gauss-Legendre Quadrature with 40 nodes in each dimen-
sion is used to approximate the various double integrals. Numerically minimizing the sum of squared
deviations from the equilibrium conditions with the Gauss-Newton method solves for the equilibrium
values. Appropriate scaling of the arguments and of the equilibrium conditions is important for the
accuracy of the result. Convergence is only achieved with ’good’ starting values. Starting values are
obtained from a grid search over the six-dimensional space of possible values. Diﬀerent starting values
lead to the same equilibrium values.
21These labels are arbitrary. There is always a second equilibrium with lower taxes in community
1. If the two communities have the same physical size, these two equilibria are identical except for the
community index.
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Figure 5: Income and taste segregation in equilibrium. The left ﬁgure shows the pre-
ferred community for all household types. The right ﬁgure shows the resulting income
distributions in both communities.
rich Swiss municipalities indeed have nicer school buildings, cleaner streets, nicer parks
and larger public pools than pool communities. The calibrated model cannot explain
the on average lower housing prices in the periphery. Note, however, that the predicted
relationship is valid for the group of very low tax communities in the periphery (see
Figure 1).
The segregation of the population in the two communities is shown in Figure 5.
The left picture shows the locus of indiﬀerent households, ˆ y12, which turns out to be
an increasing function of income in the present equilibrium. This implies that, given
a subpopulation with equal tastes, richer households prefer the low-tax-high-price com-
munity.22 However, this does not lead to perfect income segregation between the two
communities since the households have diﬀerent preferences. Although the average in-
come in the center is much lower than in the periphery, households from almost all
income groups can be found in both communities. The right picture in Figure 5 presents
the resulting income distributions in the two communities. Figure 5 left also shows the
loci of pivotal voters which split the communities’ populations into half. Note that both
the distribution in the center and in the periphery are skewed to the right and the mean
is considerably above the median. This replicates the observed pattern in the Zurich
area. Households in the rich suburbs vote for more public goods than households in the
poor center, yet this generous public good provision can be ﬁnanced by a lower tax rate,
due to the higher average income of the residents.
Kessler and L¨ ulfesmann (2004) also predict that rich households locate in low-tax
22Note that all households with a very high taste for housing prefer to live in the low-price community.
This, however, applies to only 5% of the population, as the weight on taste parameters above 0.38 is low.
20communities. However in their model the attractiveness of low taxes has to be oﬀset by
low public good provision in the rich community. In my model, it is the high housing
prices that deter the poor from moving to rich communities which oﬀer both attractive
taxes and public good provision. The high public goods provision in the rich community
is shared with the empirical study by Epple and Sieg (1999) and the theoretical work by
Epple, Filimon and Romer (1984, 1993) as well as the very simplied version on p. 297 of
Nechyba’s (1997) model.23 All of these model predict higher after-property-tax housing
prices in the rich community but they do note make a statement about the relation
of taxes. Note that Epple and Romer (1991) and Epple and Platt (1998) predict -
somewhat against their own evidence - the exactly opposite relation of public good
provision (modelled as a lump-sum transfer) and housing prices across communities.
Hansen and Kessler (2001a) predict lower taxes, lower public good provision (modelled
as a lump-sum transfer) and higher higher housing prices in the rich community. Hence
neither of these models is able to explain the pattern of community characteristics as
observed in Swiss metropolitan areas.
3.3 Welfare Consequences of Decentralization
The above segregated equilibrium is now compared to the equilibrium when jurisdictions
harmonized their income tax levels and households located randomly.24 The equilibrium
values with tax harmonization are presented in column 5 in Table 1. One can imme-
diately see that the housing price, tax level and public good provision lie between the
corresponding values in the two-community model. The decentralization of tax authority
to two communities does thus not lead to an overall reduction of taxes, but to relatively
lower taxes in the rich community and higher taxes in the poor community.
The welfare eﬀects from decentralized taxation and the associated segregated equi-
librium depend on both the households’ incomes and tastes. They are revealed by in-
specting the compensating variation (cv), deﬁned the additional gross income that com-
pensates a household for a shift from the equilibrium with harmonized taxes (th,ph,gh)
to the segregated equilibrium:25
V (th,ph,gh;y,α) = V (tj,pj,gj;y + cv,α)
The implied compensating variation cv depends on both the household’s income y and
23The general model of Nechyba provides an powerful existence proof under very weak conditions for
the case of property taxation but yields only limited statements on the possibly emerging segregation of
the population.
24Tax harmonization is equivalent to the equilibrium that would emerge if the two distinct jurisdictions
merged. It is also equivalent to the (non-stable) symmetric equilibrium in the decentralized situation.













































































































































Figure 6: Welfare costs of decentralication. The left ﬁgure shows contour lines of the
compensating variation (cv) for all household types. The right ﬁgure shows the com-
pensating variation for households with housing taste α = Eα = 0.17.
taste α as well as the community j it chooses in the decentralized case:
cvj(y,α) =




gj−βg )γ − [y(1 − tj) − βb − pjβh]
1 − tj
.
Table 1 reports the average cv’s for each community. Households in the poor community
have to be compensated by an average income allowance of CHF 51 compared to CHF
84 in the rich community. Note that this amount is only about one-tenth of a percent
of average gross income.
The reported average of the compensating variation hides the heterogeneity of welfare
consequences across diﬀerent household types. The left picture in Figure 6 shows contour
lines of the cv for all household types. Households in the shaded band between the two
zero contour lines exhibit positive values of the cv and thus prefer tax harmonization.
Households further away from the border household prefer competing jurisdictions. The
right picture in Figure 6 shows the cv across incomes for a household with housing taste
α = α = 0.17. Note that given these housing tastes, households with income below
CHF 40,000, log(y) < 10.6, live in the poor community 1. The poorest in the poor
community, log(y) < 10.35, prefer decentralication, the poorest by a cv of almost CHF
-200. The relatively richer in the poor community, 10.35 > log(y) < 10.6, prefer tax
harmonization. The border household, which is indiﬀerent between the two communities,
needs a compensation of more than CHF 200 to prefer decentralization. The households
in the rich community have opposed preferences towards ﬁscal decentralization: the
relatively richer, log(y) > 12.3, prefer decentralization whereas the relatively poorer,
10.6 > log(y) < 12.3, would prefer harmonized taxes. Summing up, the households with
a clear preference for one of the two communities will also beneﬁt the most from the
22decentralized arrangement. The number of households that prefer tax harmonization is
also given for each community in Table 1: 60% of the population in the poor community
and 71% of the population in the rich community prefer tax harmonization.26
3.4 The Role of Preference Heterogeneity
How does the heterogeneity of tastes aﬀects the properties of the equilibrium? I will
answer this question by studying the calibrated model assuming diﬀerent levels of taste
variance while leaving the average level of tastes constant.
Let me start with the extreme case of homogeneous tastes. Columns 3 and 4 in
Table 1 give the equilibrium values for this case. The population is now perfectly seg-
regated by incomes. Consequently, the income diﬀerence between the two communities
is much larger than with heterogeneous tastes. Also, the diﬀerences in prices, taxes and
public good provision across the communities are much stronger. Separating the single
peaked right-skewed distribution into to closed intervals leaves a right-skewed distrib-
ution (median smaller than average income) in the rich community and a left-skewed
(median greater than average income) distribution in the poor community. The welfare
eﬀects under the assumption of taste homogeneity are substantially greater than under
heterogeneity. Note that taste heterogeneity has no impact on the equilibrium values in
a uniﬁed community, i.e. column 1 shows the equilibrium values for all degrees of taste
heterogeneity.27
Figure 7 shows a series of equilibrium values for diﬀerent degrees of taste hetero-
geneity measured by the standard deviation SD(α), leaving the mean of tastes constant.
The horizontal axes cover a range from SD(α) = 0 (taste homogeneity) to a maximum
SD(α) = 0.14328 including the calibrated case SD(α) = 0.11. The picture reveals that
the equilibrium approaches the values of the situation with a uniﬁed community, in-
dicated by the dotted lines. This is explained by the fact that with increasing taste
variance, the population is more and more segregated by taste rather than income. This
result suggests that taste heterogeneity is able to lower the negative distributional eﬀects
of a decentralized tax regime. Figure 7 (far right) shows the corresponding change of
the average compensating variation. While the average CV in the poor community is
almost unaﬀected by the amount of taste heterogeneity in the population, it falls sharply
26Allowing for transfer payments between those who proﬁt and those who loose from decentralization
will change the number of households in favor of tax harmonization. This observation opens the ﬂoor
for a politico-economic analysis of the choice for ﬁscal decentralization which is, however, beyond the
scope of this paper.
27The uniﬁed equilibrium in the case of taste homogeneity is theoretically diﬀerent from the one in the
case of taste heterogeneity as the pivotal voter varies with the taste parameter. However, this diﬀerence
is numerically negligible.
28Given the mean Eα = 0.17, SD(α) = 0.143 is the maximal standard deviation that preserves the










































































Figure 7: Equilibrium values for diﬀerent variance of tastes. The dashed lines indicate
the values with tax harmonization. The circles indicate the calibrated equilibrium.
in the rich community. The fraction of households in the rich community which would
prefer harmonized taxes (not reported) falls accordingly from 100% (SD(α) = 0) to 65%
(SD(α) = 0.143). Partial taste segregation also generates right-skewed distributions in
both communities.
3.5 The Role of Relative Land Area
How does the relative land area in the two jurisdictions aﬀect the properties of the
equilibrium? Up to now, the physical land area was given by the calibration. However,
(historical) community borders in other metropolitan areas lead to diﬀerent ratios of
center to periphery land area.
Figure 8 shows a series of equilibrium values for diﬀerent relative size of the jurisdic-
tions. The horizontal axes speciﬁes the land area L1 of the poor community, called the
center, as fraction of total land area. The housing price and the public good provision in











































































Figure 8: Equilibria for diﬀerent relative area of the communities. The dashed lines indi-
cate the values with tax harmonization. The circles indicate the calibrated equilibrium.
munity shows higher taxes, lower public good provision and lower housing prices than
the rich community throughout all possible partitions of land between the two commu-
nities. The order of community characteristics is hence not aﬀected by the relative land
area. Not surprisingly, the equilibrium values of a community that virtually covers the
whole area (L1 = 1 or L1 = 0, hence L2 = 1) equal the values of the equilibrium with
tax harmonization, marked by the dotted lines. The equilibrium values in the remaining
very small community diﬀer maximally from the values in the case of uniﬁed communi-
ties. The tax rate in the rich community 2 declines with increasing relative land area
in community 1. This shows that the rich community has more power to set low taxes
when it is physically small. This weakly corresponds to the ﬁndings by Hansen and
Kessler (2001a), who show that segregated equilibria exist only when the rich commu-
nity is small. However, my results demonstrate that their ﬁnding is very model speciﬁc
and segregation can also emerge in situations with equally sized local jurisdictions.
The inﬂuence of the relative land area on welfare is particularly interesting. Recall
25that in the calibrated situation (L1 = 0.4), the average household prefers harmonized
taxes: average compensating variation is CHF 51 in the center and CHF 84 in the
periphery. This result does strongly depend on the relative community size as can be seen
in Figure 8 (far right). The average compensating variation in the poor center community
is negative if this community is small (L1 < 0.3), meaning that the population in the
center does on average prefer (higher) local taxes to (lower) harmonized taxes, as they are
associated with lower housing prices.29 Note that it is the poorer part of the population
in the poor community that proﬁts most from the local diﬀerences. The rich periphery
shows a similar picture. Its increased ability to set low taxes when it is small (L2 <
0.27) leads to a negative average compensating variation, i.e. an average preference for
decentralized taxation.30 Note that it is the richer part of the population that proﬁts
most from the decentralized tax setting.
3.6 The Role of Preferences towards the Public Good
How do the assumed preferences for the local public good aﬀect the properties of the
equilibrium? This section explores the eﬀect of the elasticity of substitution between the
public and the private good.31 The elasticity of substitution measures how easily a house-
hold can substitute the public good with the composite private goods. Unfortunately,
there is no single parameter that sets the elasticity of substitution given Stone-Geary














is described by the parameter βg as well as γ and depends on the households income
(via the private good consumption b) and the taste α for housing (see the Appendix for
derivation). In the calibrated equilibrium, I set γ to 0.02 and βg = 4000 to a value that
produces average tax rates as observed. In this section I vary σg,b while holding the








(1 − α)(g − βg)
(b − βb)γ
for any household type constant. This is guaranteed by holding (g − βg)/γ constant.
Holding the marginal rate of substitution has several favorable properties. Firstly, this
29The majority of households in the center prefer decentralized tax setting when L1 < 0.26.
30When the rich community is even smaller (L2 < 0.11), the supporters of local taxation is on the
majority. This result indicates - speculating beyond the limits of the model - that the rich would choose
to locate in a small community. Anecdotic evidence from Switzerland and Europe suggest that tax
havens are indeed usually small.
31This exercise could as well be based on the elasticity of substitution between the public and housing.
See the formulas in the Appendix.












































































Figure 9: Equilibrium value for diﬀerent levels of substitutability between public and
private good. The dashed lines indicate the values with tax harmonization. The circles
indicate the calibrated equilibrium.
procedure changes the curvature of indiﬀerence curves while leaving them tangential at
any given values of g and b, hence separating the eﬀect from curvature from the overall
esteem for the public good. Secondly, this leaves the values of the benchmark equilibrium
of uniﬁed communities unchanged as the marginal rate of substitution between the local
public good and local tax rates, Mg,t, and therefore the pivotal voter’s perceived trade-oﬀ
between public good provision and taxes
dg
dt |dV =0,HD=HS remains also constant.
Figure 9 shows a series of the equilibrium values for γ ranging from 0 to 0.18 and
βg accordingly from 5032 to −4350. The implied elasticity of substitution between the
public and the private good for a household with average income and taste is graphed
on the horizontal axes and ranges from 0 to 1.72. The extreme case on the left with
γ = 0, βg = 5032, σb,g = 0 means that the public good and private good are perfect
complements. In this situation, the equilibrium public good provision is exogenously
given as g = βg = 5032. Despite the identical public good provision, there is income
sorting across the two communities resulting in the typically observed pattern of com-
27munity characteristics: the rich community 2 exhibits lower taxes and higher housing
prices than the poor community 1. The lower taxes in the rich community are a di-
rect consequence of the larger tax base per capita. The high housing prices in the rich
community scare the poor more than the rich and keep them from locating the low-tax
community.
Increasing the elasticity of substitution between g and b changes the properties of the
equilibrium fundamentally. The population n2 in the rich community shrinks and be-
comes richer (Ey2) with increasing σg,b. The public good provision, g, increases monoton-
ically in the rich community and decreases monotonically in the poor community. Note
that median household income is smaller than than average income over the whole range
of σg,b and in both communities. The pivotal voters therefore successfully use the pub-
lic good provision as an instrument for redistribution. The pivotal voters in the rich
community target a higher level of public good provision as the average income in the
rich community increases, the marginal tax rate to ﬁnance an additional unit of public
goods decreases. The tax rates in the two communities show the most dramatic changes:
the tax rate in the poor community is initially larger, increases slightly before it falls
monotonically to zero. The tax rate in the rich community is initially smaller, falls
slightly and increases than steadily. Housing prices in the rich community are higher
than in the poor community over the whole range of σg,b. Interestingly, for higher degree
of substitutability of the public good the rich choose the community that oﬀers more
public good provision even though that community yields high taxes and high housing
prices. This is a consequence of the the assumed linear expenditure system which implies
that the marginal rate of substitution between the public and the private good increases
with income, i.e. the public good becomes a more and more scarce good. Note that
there is an equilibrium in which the tax rates in the two communities equal. The income
sorting of the population is in this situation fully driven by the trade-oﬀ between local
public good provision and local housing prices.
The numerical results in the exercise in this section are very model and parameter
speciﬁc. However, there are two general lessons. Firstly, diﬀerent form the literature
on property taxation, there is no natural order of community characteristics in multi-
community models with income taxation. Rich communities may be attractive to rich
people because of either low taxes or a high level of public good provision. Secondly, the
non-existence proposition of Hansen and Kessler (2001b) is very speciﬁc to their model
and does not apply in general income tax models.
4 Conclusions
This paper presents a model of an urban area with local income taxes used to ﬁnance
a local public good. The main assumptions of the model are the following: Households
28diﬀer in incomes and tastes for housing. The demands for housing and non-housing
consumption is a linear expenditure system. The share of housing in the budget of the
households is on average declining with income. Non-housing consumption is only a
partial substitute for the publicly provided good.
The existence of a segregated equilibrium is shown in a calibrated two-community
model assuming realistic single-peaked distributions for income and taste in housing. The
high-tax community exhibits both a lower housing price and a lower public good provision
than the low-tax community. The equilibrium features segregation of households by
both incomes and tastes. The emerging segregation pattern is such that rich households
prefer the low-tax high-price community, given a subpopulation with equal tastes. If
tastes diﬀer across households, this does not lead to a perfect income segregation but to
an income distribution in the rich low-tax community that stochastically dominates the
income distribution in the poor high-tax community: while households from all income
groups can be found in both communities, average income in the center is much lower
than in the periphery. The model is able to explain the substantial diﬀerences of local
income tax levels and of average incomes across communities as observed in Switzerland.
The numerical investigation shows that the order of community characteristics de-
pends on the preferences for the local public good. The above ordering of community
characteristics holds for low degrees of substitutability between public and private goods.
When the public good is easily substituted by private goods the rich community exhibits
higher housing prices and public goods provision as well as higher taxes.
The numerical investigation also suggests that taste heterogeneity reduces the distri-
butional eﬀects of local tax diﬀerences. The diﬀerences of characteristics across commu-
nities are maximal when tastes are equal for all households and when the population is
accordingly perfectly segregated by income. These diﬀerences decrease with increasing
taste heterogeneity as the income segregation of the population becomes more and more
diﬀuse.
The numerical investigation furthermore suggests that the relative size of the indi-
vidual jurisdictions has great impact on the equilibrium outcome. The characteristics
of a relatively large community are close to the equilibrium characteristics of a single
jurisdiction that covers the whole area. Conversely, the relatively small community dif-
fers substantially from the single jurisdiction. For example, rich communities are able to
set lower taxes when they are small. However, contrary to the ﬁndings by Hansen and
Kessler (2001a), a tax haven need not be small.
Multi-community models are especially well-suited to study metropolitan areas as
they assume that the residence choice of a household is made after and independent of
the decision of where its members work. Nevertheless the results presented in this paper
may also shed light on ﬁscal decentralization at the level of states or countries.
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The household problem is
max
h,b
U(h,b,g,α) = αln(h − βh) + (1 − α)ln(b − βb) + γ ln(g − βg)
s.t. ph + b ≤ y(1 − t).
This leads to the housing demand
h∗ = h(t,p,y,α) =
α[y(1 − t) − pβh − βb]
p
+ βh ,







α[y(1 − t) − pβh − βb] + pβh
and the indirect utility function
V = αln(α) + (1 − α)ln(1 − α) − αln(p) + ln[y(1 − t) − pβh − βb] + γ ln(g − βg).
The marginal rates of substitution in Property 1 are derived by totally diﬀerentiating



































(g − βg)(pβh + βb)







(1 − t)(g − βg)βh















y(1 − t) − pβh − βb
py
.

















[(1 − α)pβh − αβb](g − βg)
,
where Mt,g = 1/Mg,t.
The locus of indiﬀerent households between community j and i
ˆ yji(α) =
(pj βh + βb)pi
α (gj − βg)
γ − (βb + pi βh)pj
α (gi − βg)
γ
(1 − tj)pi
α (gj − βg)
γ − (1 − ti)pj
α (gi − βg)
γ .









The locus ˆ αji(y) is either strictly increasing and concave in y or strictly decreasing and




(1 − tj)[piβh − βb] − (1 − ti)[pjβh − βb]






(1 − tj)[y(1 − ti) − piβh − βb] + (1 − ti)[y(1 − tj) − pjβh − βb]
[y(1 − tj) − pjβh − βb][y(1 − ti) − piβh − βb]
and provided that all household reach the subsistence level, i.e. y(1−t) > pβh +βb > 0,
in both communities.
The utility diﬀerence between community j and i is




y(1 − tj) − pjβh − βb
y(1 − ti) − piβh − βb





















= ln(pi) − ln(pj).
The rate of substitution between tax rate and public good provision a voter faces is
derived from totally diﬀerentiating the indirect utility function considering the housing
market reaction, dp/dt|HD=HS (community subscripts omitted):
dg
dt













= Mg,t + Mg,p  
dp
dt




γ[y(1 − t) − pβh − βb]
￿







31The voter’s rate of substitution is positive when the price eﬀect on the housing market














ph∗ for all α.






















γ[y(1 − t) − pβh − βb]2
￿

























Both the condition on the sign of the voter’s marginal rate of substitution and the sign




HD=HS< 1 (see Deﬁnition 3) and all
households reach the subsistence level.
The compensating variation cvj is the additional gross income that a household in e.g.
community j needs in order to be compensated for a shift from the symmetric (tax
harmonization) equilibrium, (th,ph,gh), to the asymmetric (segregated) equilibrium,
(tj,pj,gj). Solving
V (th,ph,gh;y,α) = V (tj,pj,gj;y + cv,α)
for cv yields the compensating variation for a household with income y and taste α in
community j:
cvj(y,α) =




gj−βg )γ − [y(1 − tj) − βb − pjβh]
1 − tj
.










The marginal rates of substitution between the public and the private goods used in










































































Both elasticities of substitution are increasing in γ holding (g − βg)/γ constant (thus
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